Saturday, February 4, 2017

Cheque bounce cases or 138 Negotiable Instruments Act cases:


Nowadays almost every person is aware of cheque bounce cases.  But few people only know what it is exactly.  The Negotiable Instrument Act was amended giving room to punish people who give cheque without maintaining balance in their account.  Before amending the act if any body give cheque without balance that is not an offence, but a civil liability.  i.e., the person  who holds the cheque can sue for recovery of money.  But since the introduction of 138 of Act the Person is liable for punishment.
Lets consider relevent terms in connection with cheque bounce offences.
1 [ 6 “Cheque”. —A “cheque” is a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand and it includes the electronic image of a truncated cheque and a cheque in the electronic form. Explanation I. —For the purposes of this section, the expressions—

 “a cheque in the electronic form” means a cheque which contains the exact mirror image of a paper cheque, and is generated, written and signed in a secure system ensuring the minimum safety standards with the use of digital signature (with or without biometrics signature) and asymmetric crypto system;


 “a truncated cheque” means a cheque which is truncated during the course of a clearing cycle, either by the clearing house or by the bank whether paying or receiving payment, immediately on generation of an electronic image for transmission, substituting the further physical movement of the cheque in writing.

Explanation II. —For the purposes of this section, the expression “clearing house” means the clearing house managed by the Reserve Bank of India or a clearing house recognised as such by the Reserve Bank of India.]

7 “Drawer”, “drawee”. —The maker of a bill of exchange or cheque is called the “drawer”; the person thereby directed to pay is called the “drawee”. “drawee in case of need”. —When in the bill or in any indorsement thereon the name of any person is given in addition to the drawee to be resorted to in case of need such person is called a “drawee in case of need”. “acceptor”. —After the drawee of a bill has signed his assent upon the bill, or, if there are more parts thereof than one, upon one of such parts, and delivered the same, or given notice of such signing to the holder or to some person on his behalf, he is called the “acceptor”. “acceptor for honour”. — 2 [When a bill of exchange has been noted or protested for non-acceptance or for better security], and any person accepts it supra protest for honour of the drawer or of any one of the indorsers, such person is called an “acceptor for honour”. “Payee”. —The person named in the instrument, to whom or to whose order the money is by the instrument directed to be paid, is called the “payee”.

“Holder”.—The “holder” of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque means any person entitled in his own name to the possession thereof and to receive or recover the amount due thereon from the parties thereto. Where the note, bill or cheque is lost or destroyed, its holder is the person so entitled at the time of such loss or destruction.

9 “Holder in due course”.—“Holder in due course” means any person who for consideration became the possessor of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque if payable to bearer, or the payee or indorsee thereof, if 1[payable to order], before the amount mentioned in it became payable, and without having sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed in the title of the person from whom he derived his title.

These are the terms we often come across the 138 cases.

The Sec.138 says:

18 [ 138 Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. —Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for 19 [a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—

    (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

    (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, 20 [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
   (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.]

THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881

1[ 139 Presumption in favour of holder.—It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.]

THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881

1[140 . Defence which may not be allowed in any prosecution under section 138.—It shall not be a defence in a prosecution for an offence under section 138 that the drawer had no reason to believe when he issued the cheque that the cheque may be dishonoured on presentment for the reasons stated in that section.]
21 [ 141 Offences by companies. —
(1)  If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence: 22 [Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.]
 (2)  Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,—
  (a)  “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
 (b)  “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.]
23 [ 142 Cognizance of offences. —Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;
 (b)  such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138: 24 [Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.]

  (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.] COMMENTS

 (i) Consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days as envisaged under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed, arises, and the period of one month for filing the complaint under section 142 is to be reckoned accordingly; Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, AIR 1998 SC 3043.
(ii)  A manager or any other person authorised by the company can represent it during the course of legal proceedings before the court and file a complaint; Salar Solvent Extractions Ltd. v. South India Viscose Ltd., (1994) 3 Crimes 295 (Mad).
 (iii)  The Magistrate while taking cognizance has to look into the question whether the ingredients of an offence have been made out or not; M/s. Pearey Lal Rajendra Kumar Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1994) 3 Crimes 308 (Raj).
(iv) The cause of action for filing complaint would arise after the completion of 15 days from the date the drawer receives the notice and fails to pay the amount within that period; V.N. Samant v. M/s. K.G.N. Traders, (1994) 3 Crimes 725 (Karn).
(v) The payee cannot lodge a complaint after the completion of one month from the date on which the cause of action arose as there is a bar under clause (b) of section 142; V.N. Samant v. M/s. K.G.N. Traders, (1994) 3 Crimes 725 (Karn).
(vi) So long as the period of notice does not expire there can be no cause of action with the payee to make the drawer liable criminally; T.K. Khungar v. Sanjay Ghai, (1994) 3 Crimes 802 (P & H).

(vii) It is well settled that it is not necessary for the Magistrate to specifically state that he is taking cognizance of the offence. If he takes steps as provided under section 200, of the Code of Criminal Procedure then it necessarily means that he has taken cognizance of the offence; R. Rajendra Reddy v. M/s. Sujaya Feeds, (1994) 3 Crimes 692 (Karn).

(viii) The complainant must allege in his complaint that the cheque was dishonoured due to want of sufficient amount in the account, even if the payment was stopped; Ballakrishna Pillai v. Abdullakutty, (1994) 2 Crimes 327 (Ker).

(ix) Once a cause of action has arisen, the limitation will begun to run and it could not be stopped by presenting the cheque again so as to have a fresh cause of action and fresh limitation; M/s. Chahal Engineering and Construction Ltd. v. M/s. Verma Plywood Co., (1994) 1 Crimes 845 (P & H).

(x) The criminal prosecution has to be launched within one month of the expiry of 15 days' period from the issuance of notice as provided by section 142(b) of the Act; M/s. Chahal Engineering and Construction Ltd. v. M/s. Verma Plywood Co., (1994) 1 Crimes 845 (P & H).

(xi) When the cheque stood issued in favour of a company, a complaint under section 138 of the Act can be filed by its Manager, Partner, Director or any person authorised by the company; M/s. Ruby Leather Exports v. K. Venu, (1994) 1 Crimes 820 (Mad).
(xii) There is no ambiguity in clause (a) of section 142 of the Act, which prohibits or excludes complaints being initiated by Power of Attorney, agents of the payee or the holder in due course. A Power of Attorney, will be competent to initiate a private complaint by stepping into the shoes of the payee or the holder in due course; M/s. Ruby Leather Exports v. K. Venu, (1994) 1 Crimes 820 (Mad).

THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881

1[143. Power of Court to try cases summarily.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under this Chapter shall be tried by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trials: Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and an amount of fine exceeding five thousand rupees: Provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of, a summary trial under this section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code.

(2) The trial of a case under this section shall, so far as practicable, consistently with the interests of justice, be continued from day to day until its conclusion, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the trial beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded in writing.
(3) Every trial under this section shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible and an endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date of filing of the complaint.
THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881

144. Mode of service of summons.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and for the purposes of this Chapter, a Magistrate issuing a summons to an accused or a witness may direct a copy of summons to be served at the place where such accused or witness ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works; for gain, by speed post or by such courier services as are approved by a Court of Session.

(2) Where an acknowledgment purporting to be signed by the accused or the witness or an endorsement purported to be made by any person authorised by the postal department or the courier services that the accused or the witness refused to take delivery of summons has been received, the Court issuing the summons may declare that the summons has been duly served.
THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881
145. Evidence on affidavit.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the evidence of the complainant may be given by him on affidavit and may, subject to all just exceptions be read in evidence in any enquiry, trial or other proceeding under the said Code.

(2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, and shall, on the application of the prosecution or the accused, summon and examine any person giving evidence on affidavit as to the facts contained therein.

THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881

146. Bank’s slip prima facie evidence of certain facts.—The Court shall, in respect of every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of bank’s slip or memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved.

THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881

146. Bank’s slip prima facie evidence of certain facts.—The Court shall, in respect of every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of bank’s slip or memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved.

147 Offences to be compoundable. —Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable.

THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881 SCHEDULE.—Enactment repealed.—[Rep. by the Amending Act, 1891 (12 of 1891), sec. 2 and Sch. I.]

1. Subs. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 2, for “A “cheque” is a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand" (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
2. Ins. by Act 5 of 1914, sec. 2.
3. Ins. by Act 5 of 1914, sec. 2.
4. Added by Act 5 of 1914, sec. 3.
5. Added by Act 5 of 1914, sec. 3.
6. Subs. by the A.O. 1937, for “Local Government”.
7. Ins. by Act 2 of 1885, sec. 4.
8. Subs. by Act 12 of 1921, sec. 3, for “for payment”.
9. Subs. by Act 66 of 1988, sec. 2, for “six per centum” (w.e.f. 30-12-1988).
10. Ins. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 4 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003 ).
11. Ins. by Act 17 of 1934, sec. 2.
12. Ins. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 5 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003 ).
13. The words “and such declaration must be recorded by the notary in his register” omitted by Act 2 of 1885, sec. 8.
14. Subs. by Act 66 of 1988, sec. 3, for “six per centum” (w.e.f. 30-12-1988).
15. Explanation re-numbered as Explanation I thereof by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 6 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
16. The words “law of British India” were successively amended by A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and Act 3 of 1951, sec. 3 and Sch. to read as above.
17. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, sec. 3 and Sch., for “the States”.
18. sections 138 ins. by Act 66 of 1988, sec. 4 (w.e.f. 1-4-1989 ).
19. Subs. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 7, for "a term which may be extended to one year" (w.e.f. 6-2-2003 ).
20. Subs. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 7, for "within fifteen days" (w.e.f. 6-2-2003 ).
21. Ins. by Act 66 of 1988, sec. 4 (w.e.f. 1-4-1989).
22. Ins. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 8 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
23. Ins. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 9 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
24. Ins. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 9 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
As we observed above the litigation pertaining to the cheque bounces are becoming a major litigation in the country. 

Since the giving of cheque without balance in account is an offence and the cases are easy to file and less time in comparable with civil cases are taken, besides that no court fee is payable people are opting to file 138 NI Act cases.  It is not out of place to say that many un authorised money lenders and private chit fund owners are also taking advantage of this easy tryl.  Day after day many people are suffering for the following:

The private money lender by lending small amount taking a cheque of heavy amount and filing criminal cases.  The accused could not place any defence of the same before the courts and ultimately they have to suffer criminal punishment i.e., sentence to Jail.  In some cases the accused to safe guard their skin are going to compromise with the complainant by paying more and more money to them by facing many trebles.

Nowadays Bankers are also taking advantage of this procedure.  Inspite of filing a civil case they also opting to file criminal case under 138 NI act.

I saw several cases wherein innocent people were became subject for harassment of 138 NI Act. 

I think it is high time to amend the act in the following way.

If any debt is given to any person that should be only by way of crossed cheque and on the basis of cheque only promissory note should be executed.  If any transaction is not by way of cheque or Demand Draft was not made at the time of lending money that should not attract 138 NI act.  More over if a person who is not a professional moneylender than only cheque bounce cases strictly should attract.

At the time of filing of a complaint the complainant should declare that the present case is only a transaction of lending money which does  not attract professional money lenders act, he further declare that except the present case he was not filed any more 138 NI Act cases and also should undertake that he will not file any more cases.every transaction should be shown in income tax returns.

I request the state to incorporate these points in future amendments so as to curtail false, fake and unfair litigation.  So that only real people will come to the court.

As far as Bank transactions are concerned sec.138 completely  made not applicable for Bank transactions. 

If anybody having any doubt with regarding these cases can contact the author. 


Tuesday, November 24, 2015

Land Mark Judgement of Order 7 rule 11 of C.P.C. Supreme court of India

Supreme Court of India
T. Arivandandam vs T. V. Satyapal & Another on 14 October, 1977
Equivalent citations: 1977 AIR 2421, 1978 SCR (1) 742
Author: V Krishnaiyer
Bench: Krishnaiyer, V.R.
           PETITIONER:
T. ARIVANDANDAM

 Vs.

RESPONDENT:
T.   V. SATYAPAL & ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/10/1977

BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:
 1977 AIR 2421    1978 SCR  (1) 742
 1977 SCC  (4) 467


ACT:
Civil Procedure Code (Act V. 1908), section 35A, Order VII,
rule 11 and 10-Duties of the court in curbing frivolous  and
vexatious cases.



HEADNOTE:
Respondent  No.  2 in partnership, with his  minor  son  the
petitioner contested  an  eviction petition filed by  the
landlord-respondent  No. 1 in respect of the premises  where
the partnership firm was located, and lost it at the  trial,
appellate and  revisional  stages. The High Court  gave  six
months'  time  to  vacate  the premises.  Thereafter,  the
petitioners filed a suit before the Fourth Additional  First
class Munsif, Bangalore for a declaration that the order  of
eviction which     has  been confirmed right upto the High
Court  and resisted by the second respondent throughout  was
one obtained by fraud and collusion and sought an injunction
against  the execution of the eviction order.       During
the hearing    of the prayer for further time to vacate  the
premises filed by respondent No. 2, the learned Judge of the
High Court, taking pity on the tenant persuaded the landlord
for giving time for vacating the premises on the basis that
the suit newly and sinisterly filed by the petitioner  would
be   withdrawn.  Another  five months'  time  was   granted
accordingly.  But,  the petitioner instituted  another suit
before another Munsif making a carbon copy of the old plaint
and obtained   an  ex-parte injunction which  was,  however,
got vacated later by the respondent No. 1. An appeal against
the said order having failed, the petitioner managed to  get
an ex-parte injunction once over again in revision from  the
High  Court. At the hearing of the application for  vacating
the  temporary injunction filed by respondent No.  1,  the
petitioner  submitted  that the said  learned  Judge  having
decided  the  earlier  revision case  should  not  hear  the
petition on the plea of bias referring to an affidavit filed
by  him  to  that effect. But the learned  Judge  heard  the
arguments, went into the merits and dismissed the revision.
Dismissing the, petition for special leave, the Court,
HELD  :  (1) If on a meaningful-nor  formal-reading  of  the
plaint it  is manifestly vexatious, and meritless,  in  the
sense  of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he  (Munsif)
should exercise his power under Order VII rule  11,  C.P.C.
taking care  to  see  that  the  ground  mentioned  therein
fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the  illusion
of a cause of action, it should be nipped in the bud at  the
first  hearing by  examining the  party  searchingly  under
Chapter  X,  C.P.C.  An  activist Judge  is  the  answer  to
irresponsible  law  suits.  The trial  court  should  insist
imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing  so
that  bogus  litigation  can be shot-down  at  the  earliest
stage. The  penal  Code (Chapter XI)  is  also  resourceful
enough to meet such men and must be triggered against them.
In  the  instant  case, the suit pending  before  the  First
Munsif's  Court,  Bangalore being a flagrant misuse  of  the
mercies  of the law in receiving plaints having no  survival
value, the court directed the Trial Court to dispose of  it
forthwith  after giving an immediate hearing of the  parties
concerned  and to take deterrent action if it  is  satisfied
that the litigation was inspired by vexatious motives and is
altogether  groundless, reminding itself of sec. 35A of  the
C.P.C. [744 E-G, 745 A]
Observation :
The pathology of litigative addition ruins the poor of this
country and the   Bar   has  a  role  to  cure this
deleterious tendency of parties to launch frivolous    and
vexatious  cases.  The sharp practice or  legal  legerdemain
stultifies the   court process and makes  a  decree
with  judicial seals brutum fulmen. It may  be  a  valuable
contribution  to  the  cause of justice  if  counsel  screen
wholly   fradulent and frivolous litigation refusing to  be
beguiled  by  dubious  clients and   remembering  that   an
advocate  is  an officer of justice and its society  not  to
collaborate in shady actions. [743 B, C, 745 B]
743
[The Court expressed its hope that the Bar Council of  India
Would activate this obligation.]



JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4483 of 1977.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19-7-1977 of the Karnataka High Court in Civil Misc. Petition No. 943 of 1977 P. R. Ramasesh for the Petitioner.
The Order of the Court was delivered by-
KRISHNA IYER, J. The pathology of litigative addiction ruins the poor of this country and the Bar has a role to cure this deleterious tendency of parties to launch frivolous and vexatious cases.
Here is an audacious application by a determined engineer of fake litigations asking for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court on an interlocutory application for injunction. The sharp practice or legal legerdemain of the petitioner, who is the son of the 2nd respondent, stultifies the court process and makes decrees with judicial seals brutum fulmen. The long arm of the law must throttle such, litigative caricatures if the confidence and credibility of the community in the judicature is to survive. The contempt power of the Court is meant for such persons as the present petitioner. We desist from taking action because of the sweet reasonableness of counsel Sri Ramasesh.
What is the horrendous enterprise of the petitioner? The learned Judge has, with a touch of personal poignancy, Judicial sensitivity and anguished anxiety, narrated the sorry story of a long-drawn out series of legal proceedings revealing how the father of the petitioner contested an eviction proceeding, lost it, appealed against it, lost again, moved a revision only to be rebuffed by summary rejection by the High Court. But the Judge, in his clement jurisdiction gratuitously granted over six months' time to vacate the premises. After having enjoyed the benefit of this indulgence the maladroit party moved for further time to vacate. AR these proceedings were being carried on by the 2nd respondent who was the father of the petitioner. Finding that the court's generosity had been exploited to the full, the 2nd respondent and the petitioner, his son, set upon a clever adventure by abuse of the process of the court. The petitioner filed a suit before the Fourth Additional First Class Munsif, Bangalore, for a declaration that the order of eviction, which had been confirmed right up to the High Court and resisted by the 2nd respondent throughout, was one obtained by 'fraud and collusion'. He sought an injunction against the execution of the eviction order. When this fact was brought to the notice of the High Court, during the hearing of the prayer for further time: to vacate, instead of frowning upon the fraudulent stroke, the learned judge took pity on the tenant and persuaded the landlord to give more time for vacating the premises on the basis that the suit newly and sinisterly filed would be. withdrawn by the petitioner. Gaining time by another five months on this score, the father and son belied the hope of the learned judge who thought that the litigative skirmishes would come to an end, but hope can be dupe when the customer concerned is a crook.
The next chapter in the litigative acrobatics of the petitioner and father soon followed since they were determined to dupe and defy the process of the court to cling on to the shop. The trick they adopted was to institute another suit before another Munsif making a carbon copy as it were of the old plaint and playing upon the likely gullibility of the new Munsif to grant an exparte injunction. The 1st respondent entered appearance and expose the, hoax played upon the court by the petitioner and the 2nd respondent. Thereupon the Munsif vacated the order of injunction he had already granted. As appeal was carried without success. Undaunted by all these defeats the petitioner came to the High Court in revision and managed to get an injunction over again. The 1st respondent promptly applied for vacating the temporary injunction and when the petition came up for hearing before Mr. justice Venkataramayya, counsel for the petitioner submitted that he should not hear the case, the pretext put forward being that the petitioner had cutely mentioned the name of the judge in the affidavit while describing the prior proceedings. The unhappy Judge, who had done all he could to help the tenant by persuading the landlord, found himself badly betrayed. He adjourned the case to the next day. The torment he underwent is obvious from his own order where he stated : "I spent a sleepless night yesterday."
Luckily, he stabilised himself the next day and heard arguments without yielding to the bullying tactics of the petitioner and impropriety of his advocate. He went into the merits and dismissed the revision. Of course, these fruitless proceedings in the High Court did not deter the petitioner from daring to move this Court for special leave to appeal.
We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now, pending before the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, be should exercise his power under Or. VII r. 1 1 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever, drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first bearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code (Ch. XI) is also resourceful enough to meet such men, and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi "It is dangerous to be too good."
The trial court in this case will remind itself of s. 35-A C.P.C. and take deterrent action if it is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexatious motives and altogether groundless. In any view, that suit has no survival value and should be disposed of forthwith after giving an immediate hearing to the parties concerned. We regret the infliction of the ordeal upon the learned Judge of the High-Court by a callous party. We more than regret the circumstance that the party concerned has been able to prevail upon one lawyer or the other to present to the court a case which was disingenuous or worse. It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients. And remembering that an advocate is an officer of justice he owes it to society not to collaborate in shady actions. The Bar Council of India, we hope will activate this obligation. We are constrained to make these observations and hope that the co-operation of the Bar will be readily forthcoming to the Bench for spending judicial time on worthwhile disputes and avoiding the distraction of sham litigation such as the one we are disposing of. Another moral of this unrighteous chain litigation is the gullible grant of ex parte orders tempts gamblers in litigation into easy courts. A judge who succumbs to ex parte pressure in unmerited cases helps devalue the judicial process. We must appreciate Shri Ramasesh for his young candour and correct advocacy.

S.R.          Petition dismissed.

Tuesday, November 10, 2015

Daughter in law is not entitled for maintenance from her in laws

Supreme Court of India
Vimalben Ajitbhai Patel vs Vatslabeen Ashokbhai Patel And ... on 14 March, 2008
Author: S.B. Sinha
Bench: S.B. Sinha, V.S. Sirpurkar
           CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil)  2003 of 2008

PETITIONER:
Vimalben Ajitbhai Patel

RESPONDENT:
Vatslabeen Ashokbhai Patel and others

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/03/2008

BENCH:
S.B. SINHA & V.S. SIRPURKAR

JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT CIVIL APPEAL NO 2003 OF 2008 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 1061 of 2007] WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 502 OF 2008 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 213 of 2007] Ajitbhai Revandas Patel and another Appellant Versus State of Gujarat and another Respondents S.B. SINHA, J :
1. Leave granted in both the matters.
2. These two appeals being inter related were taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by the common judgment.
3. Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel (Appellant in Civil Appeal is the mother in law of Sonalben Rameshchandra Desai - respondent No.3 in Civil Appeal and respondent No.2 in Criminal Appeal) while she alongwith her husband are the appellants in the Criminal Appeal. For the purpose of disposal of these appeals, Vimalben Ajitbhai Patel is being described as Appellant No.1 while her husband Ajitbhai Revandas Patel is being described as Appellant No.2.
4. Sonalben Rameshchandra Desai was married to Jitendra Ajitbhai Patel (son of the appellants) on 4th May, 1992. The couple fell apart. In 1993 a complaint petition was filed by the 3rd respondent against her husband and the appellants alleging commission of an offence underSections 406 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. In the said complaint the 3rd respondent accepted that her husband had incurred huge losses in the business in United States. Appellants were granted bail subject to the condition that they would not leave India without prior permission of the Court. Allegedly on the premise that Appellant No.2 requires medical treatment, an application for permission was filed in October 1997 but they left India without obtaining the same from the Court.
5. An application was filed for cancellation of the bail which was rejected by the Metropolitan Magistrate as also by the Sessions Judge. The 3rd respondent filed an application before the High Court being Special Criminal Application NO.1360 of 1997. The said application was allowed by the High Court by its order dated 18th November, 1997 cancelling the bail of the appellants. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate was directed to issue Standing Warrant of arrest against the appellants as and when they returned to India.
6. On an application filed by the 3rd respondent on 24th April, 1998 the husband of the appellant was declared an absconder and a public proclamation was issued in terms of Section 82(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure attaching her properties if she did not present before the Learned Magistrate within 30 days from the issuance of the said publication. There is nothing on record to show that the said order was served on the appellants. It, however, is not disputed that on their failure to remain present within a period of 30 days their properties were subjected to order of attachment under Section 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. By an order dated 5th January, 2004 the District Magistrate was asked by the Leaned Metropolitan Magistrate to take further action in terms of Section 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by holding a public auction of the said properties. In the said order it was wrongly sated that the properties belonged to the appellants and husband of the 3rd respondent, whereas in fact Appellant No.1 alone was the owner thereof.
7. The 1st Respondent (tenant) and the subsequent auction purchaser filed an application before the High Court of Gujarat which was marked as Special Civil Application No.15377 of 2004 against the Mamlatder. A learned Judge of the High Court by an order dated 5th April, 2005 directed :-
"8. In view of the above, I am inclined to pass the following order:
8.1) Rule. By interim order it is directed that the Mamlatdar - Respondent No.1 shall proceed with the auction of the premises in question on condition that the auction which may be held shall be subject to the further condition that -
i) the possession of the premises shall be handed over by the Mamlatdar to the auction purchaser, after the conclusion of the proceedings as ordered hereinafter by the ULC Authority against the petitioner as well as respondent No.3;
ii) after the auction, it would be open to the Mamlatdar to notify the said aspect regarding the transfer effected by auction in the conspicuous part of the premises and such an intimation may also be given to the concerned local authority;
iii) it is further directed that the Mamlatdar - Respondent No.1 herein shall make reference to competent Authority under ULC Act to examine the aspects as to whether the transaction between the absconder and Respondent No.3 can be said in breach of the condition of Scheme under Section 21 of the ULC Act and he shall also make reference on the aspects to the competent authority under ULC Act as to whether the action of the absconder and subsequently rectification by respondent No.3 to give the possession of the petitioner as tenant can be said in breach of the conditions of the Scheme under Section 21 on the basis of which the premises came to be allotted to the absconder original allottee. Such reference shall be made within a period of two weeks from today and the Mamlatdar shall request the concerned authority to decide the reference within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the reference. In the event it is found by the competent authority under ULC Act that the action of absconder of entering into transaction with respondent No.3 and for handing over the possession to the petitioner as unlawful, the Mamlatdar shall be at liberty to take possession of the premises in question from the petitioner and thereafter he shall further be at liberty to hand over the vacant possession of the premises to the auction purchaser.
iv) It is further directed that until the aforesaid reference is made and is decided by the Mamlatdar, the petitioner shall deposit the amount at the rate of Rs.1,500/= per month with the Mamlatdar without prejudice to the proceedings of the reference and the said amount shall remain as deposited with the Mamlatdar. In the event it is found by the competent authority under ULC Act as an outcome of the reference and the inquiry that the possession is unlawful of the petitioner and the transaction is unlawful of the absconder with respondent No.2, the Mamlatdar shall be at liberty to refund the amount. However, in the event it is found that the possession is lawful and there is no breach of the condition of allotment as per the scheme underSection 21 of the ULC Act, the Mamlatdar shall be at liberty to appropriate the amount in accordance with law."
v) The aforesaid exercise of holding auction shall be completed within a period of five weeks from today.
9. The report of the proceedings and the outcome of the reference shall also be made by the Mamlatdar to this Court."
8. However, the appellant and her husband were not made parties therein. Against the said order, an LPA, which was marked as LPA NO. 1792 of 2005, was filed by the 1st respondent and a Division Bench of the High Court directed that the amount of rent deposited by him with the Mamlatder be deposited in the High Court and the 3rd respondent will be permitted to withdraw the same without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. The said order was passed, purported to be on the premise, that the 3rd respondent had placed reliance on an order dated 13th May, 2005 passed by another Bench of the High Court in First Appeal No. 2626 of 2004 whereby her husband was directed to deposit a sum of Rs.10,000/- per month towards arrears of maintenance and to continue to deposit the same.
9. By an order dated 25th January, 2006 the 1st respondent was asked to deposit a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs (as he expressed his intention to purchase the said property) apart from a sum of Rs.10,000/- per month which was to be deposited with the Registrar by him from 10th February, 2006. It was furthermore directed :-
"6.2 The withdrawal of Rs.10,000/- by respondent No. 2-Sonalben Rameshchandra Desai shall be adjusted against any amount which may be payable to her by Jitendra Ajitbhai Patel under any orders in First Appeal No. 2626 of 2004, in any other matrimonial proceedings or in any civil or criminal case between her, her husband and her mother in law."
10. Appellant No.1 made an application to get herself impleaded as a party but her application was dismissed by the High Court on 11.9.2006. On or about 21st November, 2006 the High Court directed the first respondent to pay a sum of Rs.17 lakhs to respondent No.3 in regard to the auction sale of the property in question. Respondent No.2, Mamlatdar, was also directed to execute the deed of conveyance and register the same in the name of the 1st respondent upon full payment.
11. Appellant and her husband returned to India. They filed an application for cancellation of the said Standing Warrants. By an order dated 27th June, 2006 the said application was allowed directing :-
"Application is granted and warrant against both the applicant accused are ordered to be cancelled with a fine of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand only) each and with condition to submit one new surety of Rs.10,000/- (Ten thousand) and on executing the bond of such like amount.
CONDITIONS
1. Accused shall not leave India, without prior permission of the court.
2. Accused shall surrender his passport before the court."
12. Indisputably pursuant to the said order the Passports were deposited on 28th June, 2006 by them.
13. The 3rd respondent filed an application for setting aside the said order by filing a Criminal Miscellaneous Application before the Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad inter alia contending that the Passports had not been deposited by the accused pursuant to the said order of 27th June, 2006. The learned Additional Sessions Judge set aside the said order dated 27th June, 2006 and non-bailable warrants were directed to be issued against the appellants herein. Aggrieved thereby she filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 14340 of 2006 before the High Court on 13th December, 2006 which by reason by of the impugned judgment and order dated 27th December, 2006 has been dismissed.
14. The questions which arise for consideration are :-
(i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the property of Appellant No.1 could have been sold in auction? and
(ii) Whether in a case of this nature, the bail granted to the appellants should have been directed to be cancelled?
15. Submissions of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants are :
i) Having regard to the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 duty to maintain a wife being on the husband and not on her mother-in-law, the impugned judgments are wholly unsustainable;
ii) The property of a person who is no longer absconding, cannot be subjected to continuous attachment or sale thereof.
iii) Appellants having surrendered their Passports and having been attending the Court subsequently, the High Court committed a manifest error in directing cancellation of their bail without appreciating that the factors relevant for interfering with the order granting bail and directing cancellation of bail are distinct and different.
16. Submissions of Mr. Mayur Shah, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 3rd respondent, are :-
i) That her husband being the only son of his parents and the properties having been acquired through ancestral funds and there being no assertion that the properties are self acquired properties, she has a right of maintenance out of the Joint Family Property in terms of Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.
ii) In terms of Section 84 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, keeping in view the fact that her husband had been directed to pay maintenance @ Rs.10,000/- per month and which having not been paid, respondent No.3 could have prayed for realization of the said amount of maintenance from the sale proceeds of the auction sale.
iii) Even an offer was made that one residential property would be transferred in her name, apparently goes to show that the properties are Joint Family Properties. She, having been denied her right of maintenance, could initiate the proceeding before the Metropolitan Magistrate as also before the High Court.
iv) The Metropolitan Magistrate committed a serious error in granting bail upon cancellation of Standing Warrants as appellants have breached the conditions for grant of bail. They had, although placed a large number of documents and in particular medical certificates to show that they were ill, there is nothing on record to show that they were bed ridden and not permitted to move out.
v) Their near relatives in India would be deemed to have knowledge of the pendency of the said proceeding and in that view of he matter neither under the guise of the medical certificates nor on the ground of age, they deserve any sympathy of the Court.
17. Mr. Nikhil Goel, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent (Auction Purchaser) would submit :
i) The tenant has a right to reside in the property irrespective of the order of attachment and the same could not have been interfered with by Mamlatdar under the orders of the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate of the District Magistrate.
ii) The 1st respondent had deposited a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) each month for a period of ten months which have been withdrawn by the 3rd respondent. Out of the total auction amount of Rs.17 lakhs, the 1st respondent had deposited Rs. 4 lakhs which has been invested in a short term deposit, besides a sum of Rs.1 lakhs. He has also deposited a further sum of Rs.12 lakhs which sum have, however, since been refunded. The learned counsel would contend that in this view of the matter the amount deposited by him should be directed to be refunded with interest.
18. Sonalben Rameshchandra Desai is an Advocate. She filed a large number of cases against her husband and in-laws. She initially filed a Complaint Petition before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code which was registered as Case No.1662 of 1996. It was transferred to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baroda. It has since been dismissed for default. She initiated another criminal proceeding against the appellants and their family members under Sections 323452427504506 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, the same proceeding has also been dismissed as withdrawn. Another criminal case was initiated by her against appellant No.2, his son and another, being Case No.47 of 1996 under Section 406,420468 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, which is still pending. Another case, being No.2338 of 2006 was filed by her under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. Another case under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code being Case No.2145 of 1993 was filed against the appellants.
19. Before embarking on the questions of law which arise our consideration, we may notice some statutory provisions.
20. The matter relating to grant of maintenance are now governed by the provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Sections 3 (b), 18 and 19 of the said Act read as under :-
"3. (b) "Maintenance" includes-
(i)in all cases, provision for food, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance and treatment;
Section 18 - Maintenance of wife (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her life time.
Sub-section (2) of Section 18 thereof, however, lays down certain exceptions therefor.
Sub-section (3) of Section 18 reads :-
"(3) A Hindu wife shall not be entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her husband if she is unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion."
Section 19 - Maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law (1) A Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained after the death of her husband by her father- in-law:
Provided and to the extent that she is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property or, where she has no property of her own, is unable to obtain maintenance-
(a) from the estate of her husband or her father or mother, or
(b) from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate.
(2) Any obligation under sub-section (1) shall not be enforceable if the father-in law has not the means to do so from any coparcenary property in his possession out of which the daughter-in-law has not obtained any share, and any such obligation shall cease on the re-marriage of the daughter-in-law."
21. Maintenance of a married wife, during subsistence of marriage, is on the husband. It is a personal obligation. The obligation to maintain a daughter-in-law arises only when the husband has died. Such an obligation can also be met from the properties of which the husband is a co-sharer and not otherwise. For invoking the said provision, the husband must have a share in the property. The property in the name of the mother-in-law can neither be a subject matter of attachment nor during the life time of the husband, his personal liability to maintain his wife can be directed to be enforced against such property.
22. Wholly un-contentious issues have been raised before us on behalf of Sonalben (wife). It is well settled that apparent state of affairs of state shall be taken a real state of affairs. It is not for an owner of the property to establish that it is his self-acquired property and the onus would be on the one, who pleads contra. Sonalben might be entitled to maintenance from her husband. An order of maintenance might have been passed but in view of the settled legal position, the decree, if any, must be executed against her husband and only his properties could be attached therefor but not of her mother-in-law.
23. Sections 4 and 28 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act read as under :-
"4. Overriding effect of Act Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,-
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act;
(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus insofar as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act.
28. Effect of transfer of property on right to maintenance Where a dependant has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate, and such estate or any part thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice of the right or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against the transferee for consideration and without notice of the right."
24. Section 4 provides for a non obstante clause. In terms of the said provision itself any obligation on the part of in-laws in terms of any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of law before the commencement of the Act, are no longer valid. In view of the non obstante clause contained in Section 4, the provisions of the Act alone are applicable.Sections 18 and 19 prescribe the statutory liabilities in regard to maintenance of wife by her husband and only on his death upon the father-in-law, Mother-in-law, thus, cannot be fastened with any legal liability to maintain her daughter-in-law from her own property or otherwise.
25. In Unnamalai Ammal vs. F.W. Wilson : AIR 1921 Madras 1187 the obligation to maintain wife by a husband has been held to be a personal obligation. This Court in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria vs. State of Gujarat : (1996) 4 SCC 479 has held as under :-
"8. We have given serious thought and consideration to the submissions made above by the learned counsel for the appellant and notice that Dhayalal Hirachand, the husband of Respondent 2 Smt Manjulaben, has been found to be a person of sufficient means and income. It is also true that there are 5 natural born sons of Respondent 2 besides 2 daughters, who are all major. It is also a fact that Dalip one of the sons had contested the Municipal Election and two other sons are carrying on various businesses. According to the Law of the Land with regard to maintenance, there is an obligation of the husband to maintain his wife which does not arise by reason of any contract express or implied but out of jural relationship of husband and wife consequent to the performance of marriage. Such an obligation of the husband to maintain his wife arises irrespective of the fact whether he has or has no property, as it is considered an imperative duty and a solemn obligation of the husband to maintain his wife."
It was, furthermore, observed :-
"Further, according to Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a Hindu is under a legal obligation to maintain his wife, minor sons, unmarried daughters and aged or infirm parents. The obligation to maintain them is personal, legal and absolute in character and arises from the very existence of the relationship between the parties. But the question before us is whether a stepmother can claim maintenance from the stepson under Section 125 of the Code. In other words, whether Section 125 of the Code includes within its fold the stepmother also as one of the persons to claim maintenance from her stepson."
26. We may notice that in Balwant Kaur vs. Chanan Singh : (2000) 6 SCC 310, this Court reiterated the said principle in the following words :- "21. This provision clearly indicates that if the widowed daughter-in-law is a destitute and has no earnings of her own or other property and if she has nothing to fall back upon for maintenance on the estate of her husband or father or mother or from the estate of her son or daughter, if any, then she can fall back upon the estate of her father-in-law. This provision also indicates that in case of a widowed daughter-in-law of the family if she has no income of her own or no estate of her husband to fall back upon for maintenance, then she can legitimately claim maintenance from her father or mother. On the facts of the present case, therefore, it has to be held that Appellant 1, who was a destitute widowed daughter of the testator and who was staying with him and was being maintained by him in his lifetime, had nothing to fall back upon so far as her deceased husband's estate was concerned and she had no estate of her own.
Consequently, as per Section 19(1)( a ) she could claim maintenance from the estate of her father even during her father's lifetime. This was a pre-existing right of the widowed daughter qua testator's estate in his own lifetime and this right which was tried to be crystallised in the Will in her favour after his demise fell squarely within the provisions of Section 22(2) of the Maintenance Act."
27. The Domestic Violence Act provides for a higher right in favour of a wife. She not only acquires a right to be maintained but also thereunder acquires a right of residence. The right of residence is a higher right. The said right as per the legislation extends to joint properties in which the husband has a share.
28. Interpreting the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act this Court in S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra : (2007) 3 SCC 169 held that even a wife could not claim a right of residence in the property belonging to her mother-in-law, stating :
"17. There is no such law in India like the British Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, and in any case, the rights which may be available under any law can only be as against the husband and not against the father-in- law or mother-in-law.
18. Here, the house in question belongs to the mother- in-law of Smt Taruna Batra and it does not belong to her husband Amit Batra. Hence, Smt Taruna Batra cannot claim any right to live in the said house.
19. Appellant 2, the mother-in-law of Smt Taruna Batra has stated that she had taken a loan for acquiring the house and it is not a joint family property. We see no reason to disbelieve this statement."
29. Reliance placed by Mr. Goel on V. Tulasamma and others vs. Sehsa Reddy (Dead) by L.Rrs. : [1977] 3 SCR 261 is wholly misplaced. The question which arose for consideration therein was the nature or the right, a widow acquires in the property in which she had been in possession in lieu of maintenance. Interpreting sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act this Court held that the term "possessed" should receive a wide meaning. It is in this context this Court noticed the authorities from Sastric Hindu Law whereupon our attention has been drawn :-
"Similar observations have been made by the learned author at p. 528 of the book which may be extracted thus: 'According to both the schools, the lawfully wedded wife acquires from the moment of her marriage a right to the property belonging to the husband at the time and also to any popery that may subsequently be acquired by him. so that she becomes a co-owner of the husband, though her right is not co-equal to that of the husband, but a subordinate one. owing to her disability founded on her status of perpetual or life long tutelage or dependence.
...
This right of the wife to maintenance from her husband is not lost even if the husband renounce Hinduism.
This right subsists even after the husband's death although her husband's right as distinguished from hers may pass by survivorship or by succession to sons or even to collaterals; these simply step into the position of her husband, and she is required by Hindu law to live under their guardianship after her husband's death.' "
30. The orders passed by the High Court which are impugned before us are, thus, wholly unsustainable. They suffer from total non-application of mind.
31. The said orders might have been passed only on consideration that Sonalben is a harassed lady, but the fact that the appellant is also a much harassed lady was lost sight of. She has more sinned than sinning. Appellant and her husband are old. They suffer from various diseases. They have been able to show before the Court that they had to go to the United States of America for obtaining medical treatment. They, we would assume, have violated the conditions of grant of bail but the consequence therefore must be kept confined to the four corners of the statutes.
32. The provisions contained in Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were put on the statute book for certain purpose. It was enacted to secure the presence of the accused. Once the said purpose is achieved, the attachment shall be withdrawn. Even the property which was attached, should be restored. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not warrant sale of the property despite the fact that the absconding accused had surrendered and obtained bail. Once he surrenders before the Court and the Standing Warrants cancelled, he is no longer an absconder. The purpose of attaching the property comes to an end. It is to be released subject to the provisions of the Code. Securing the attendance of an absconding accused, is a matter between the State and the accused. Complainant should not ordinarily derive any benefit therefrom. If the property is to be sold, it vests with the State subject to any order passed underSection 85 of the Code. It cannot be a subject matter of execution of a decree, far less for executing the decree of a third party, who had no right, title or interest thereon.
33. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate had, in his order dated 5th January, 2004 wrongly asked the District Magistrate to put the said properties on auction sale stating that to be belonging to the appellants and their son. The Mamlatdar appears to have exceeded his jurisdiction in trying to evict the 1st respondent. His right as a tenant could not have been affected by reason of any order of attachment. An order of attachment of a property has nothing to do with the right of tenancy. The terms and conditions of tenancy, being governed by statute, the tenant cannot be evicted except in accordance with law. It is a matter of grave concern that an independent right was also sought to be interfered with at the instance of Sonalben
34. Right to object in terms of Section 84 of the Code to which reliance has been placed by Mr. Mayur Shah, could not have been invoked by the wife as she has no independent claim over the property. The said provisions also could not have been invoked for the purpose of execution of a decree.
35. It is in the aforementioned context that we may now consider the impugned judgment of the High Court directing cancellation of bail of the appellants.
36. The fact that they have surrendered is not in dispute. They are of old age as also the fact that they have been suffering from various diseases has also not been disputed.
37. The contention of Sonalben that the passports had not been deposited, appears to be wholly incorrect. Ajitbhai Revandas Patel was the holder of U.S. Passport. The same having expired another Passport bearing No. 217921248 was issued. It is that passport which was deposited. This is the current Passport. Allegations that they are having other passports and may leave the country appears to be wholly without any basis. They have been attending the courts. The observation made by the Metropolitan Magistrate that they had not come of their own is unfortunate. Nobody wants to come to court of law and that too as an accused, of his own.
38. The High Court committed a manifest illegality in directing cancellation of bail in so far as it failed to take into consideration that the factors relevant for setting aside an order granting bail and directing cancellation of bail are wholly distinct and different. An application for cancellation of bail must be premised on the factors envisaged under sub- section (2) of Section 439 of the Code of Criminal procedure. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate in passing the order dated 27th June, 2006 while granting bail took into consideration all the relevant factors. He imposed a fine on them. Even the passports had been surrendered. Application for cancellation of bail was filed on a mis-statement that the passports had not been surrendered. Various contentions, as noticed hereinbefore, in regard to purported suffering of the wife appears to have been taken into consideration which were wholly irrelevant. We have noticed hereinbefore that such contentions have also been raised before us not on the basis that there exists and legal principle behind the same but as an argument of desperation.
39. In Gurcharan Singh and others vs. State (Delhi Adminsitration) : 1978 (2) SCR 358 this Court held :
"24. Section 439(1) Cr. P.C. of the new Code, on the other hand, confers special powers on the High Court or the Court of Session in respect of bail. Unlike under Section 437(1) there is no ban imposed under Section 439(1), Cr. P.C. against granting of bail by the High Court or the Court of Session to persons accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is, however, legitimate to suppose that the High Court or the Court of Session will be approached by an accused only after he has failed before the Magistrate and after the investigation has progressed throwing light on the evidence and circumstances implicating the accused. Even so, the High Court or the Court of Session will have to exercise its judicial discretion in considering the question of granting of bail under Section 439(1) Cr. P.C of the new Code. The overriding considerations in granting bail to which we adverted to earlier and which are common both in the case of Section 437(1) and Section 439(1) Cr. P.C. of the new Code are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood, of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case; of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in view of so many valuable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out.
25. The question of cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) Cr. P.C. of the new Code is certainly different from admission to bail under Section 439(1) Cr. P.C. The decisions of the various High Courts cited before us are mainly with regard to the admission to bail by the High Court underSection 498 Cr. P.C. (old). Power of the High Court or of the Sessions Judge to admit persons to bail under Section 498 Cr. P.C. (old) was always held to be wide without any express limitations in law. In considering the question of b ail justice to both sides governs the judicious exercise of the Court's judicial discretion."
[See also Bhagirath Singh s/o. Mahipat Singh Judeja vs. State of Gujarat : [1984] 1 SCR 839 andJayendra Saraswathi Swamigal vs. State of Tamilnadu : 2005 (2) SCC 13].
40. We may notice that recently a Bench of this Court considered the consequence of issuance of warrant of arrest at some length in Inder Mohan Goswami and another vs. State of Uttaranchal and others : (2007) 12 SCALE 15. It was held :-
"26. Before parting with this appeal, we would like to discuss an issue which is of great public importance, i.e. how and when warrants should be issued by the Court? It has come to our notice that in many cases that bailable and non-bailable warrants are issued casually and mechanically. In the instant case, the court without properly comprehending the nature of controversy involed and without exhausting the available remedies issued non-bailable warrants. The trial court disregard the settled legal position clearly enumerated in the following two cases."
It was furthermore observed "51. In complaint cases, at the first instance, the court should direct serving of the summons along with the copy of the complaint. If the accused seem to be avoiding the summons, the court, in the second instance should issue bailable- warrant. In the third instance, when the court is fully satisfied that the accused is avoiding the court's proceeding intentionally, the process of issuance of the non-bailable warrant should be resorted to. Personal liberty is paramount, therefore, we caution courts at the first and second instance to refrain from issuing non-bailable warrants."
41. Keeping in view the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the opinion that gross injustice has been caused to the appellant. She did not deserve such harsh treatments at the hands of the High Court. Respondent No.3 speaks of her own human rights, forgetting the human rights of the appellant, far less the funadamental right of life and liberty conferred on an accused in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
42. The right of property is no longer a fundamental right. But still it is a constitutional right. Apart from constitutional right it is also a human right. The procedures laid down for deprivation thereof must be scrupulously complied with [See-Devinder Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors. : JT 2007 (12) SC 256].
43. Last but not the least, a plea of equity has been raised by Mr. Shah stating that this Court should issue some directions keeping in view the equitable principles. Reliance has been placed on Chandra Bansi Singh vs. State of Bihar : (1984) 4 SCC 316, wherein it was observed :- "16. On an analysis of the various steps taken by the parties and others in the taking of possession, there is undoubtedly a delay of about 1 years and for the purpose of calculation and convenience when rounded off, the delay may be taken to be of two years. So far as this delay is concerned, the appellants have undoubtedly a case for payment of some additional compensation in equity though not under law and as this Court is not only a Court of law but a Court of equity as well, it will be impossible for us to deny this relief to the appellants. After taking into consideration the various shades and aspects of the case we are clearly of the opinion that apart from compensation which may be awarded by the Collector or enhanced by the Judge or a higher Court, the appellants should get an equitable compensation in the form of interest calculated at the rate of 7 per cent per annum for two years on the value of land owned by each land-owner. This equitable compensation has been awarded in the special facts of this case and will not be the subject-matter of appeal, if any, under the Act on the amount of compensation. "
44. The said case arose out of a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act which has no relevance to the issues involved in these appeals.
45. On cancellation of bail Mr. Shah has relied upon a decision of this Court in Raghubir Singh vs. State of Biahr: (1986) 4 SCC 481 wherein this Court observed :-
"22. The result of our discussion and the case-law is this: An order for release on bail made under the proviso to Section 167(2) is not defeated by lapse of time, the filing of the charge-sheet or by remand to custody under Section 309(2). The order for release on bail may however be cancelled under Section 437(5) or Section 439(2). Generally the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly, are, interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice, or evasion or attempt to evade the course of justice, or abuse of the liberty granted to him. The due administration of justice may be interfered with by intimidating or suborning witnesses, by interfering with investigation, by creating or causing disappearance of evidence etc. The course of justice may be evaded or attempted to be evaded by leaving the country or going underground or otherwise placing himself beyond the reach of the sureties. He may abuse the liberty granted to him by indulging in similar or other unlawful acts. Where bail has been granted under the proviso to Section 167(2) for the default of the prosecution in not completing the investigation in 60 days, after the defect is cured by the filing of a charge- sheet, the prosecution may seek to have the bail cancelled on the ground that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence and that it is necessary to arrest him and commit him to custody. In the last mentioned case, one would expect very strong grounds indeed. "
46. A bare perusal of the decision of this Court demonstrates that the ratio laid therein runs counter to the submissions of the learned counsel.
47. Reliance has also been placed on I.J. Divakar and others vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and another : (1982) 3 SCC 341. The said decision was rendered under the Industrial Law.
Regularization was directed to be provided to the workmen. A Constitution Bench of this Court inSecretary, State of Karnataka and others vs. Umadevi and others : (2006) 4 SCC 1 opined that all such decisions shall stand overruled.
Sympathy or sentiment, as is well known, should not allow the Court to have any effect in its decision making process. Sympathy or sentiment can be invoked only in favour a person who is entitled thereto. It should never be taken into consideration as a result whereof the other side would suffer civil or evil consequences.
48. We are at a loss to understand as to on what premise such a contention has been raised. If we accept the contention of the learned counsel the same would mean that we send the old couple to jail or deprive them of their lawful right of a valuable property and/or ask them to meet obligations which statutorily are not theirs. Such a direction, in our opinion, should also not be passed, keeping in view the conduct of the 3rd respondent. She not only filed a large number of cases against her in-laws, some of which have been dismissed for default or withdrawn but also have been filing applications for cancellation of their bail on wholly wrong premise.
49. We may also notice that after the arguments were over, a strange submission was made before us. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 submitted that he may be permitted to withdraw from the case and the 3rd respondent be allowed to argue in person. Such a submission was not expected from a counsel practicing in this Court or form a party, who herself is an Advocate. We deprecate such practice.
50. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the opinion that the interest of justice shall be subserved if the impugned judgments are set aside with the following directions :-
i) The property in question shall be released from attachment.
ii) The 3rd respondent shall refund the sum of Rs. 1 lakh to the respondent with interest @ 6% per annum.
iii) The amount of Rs. 4 lakhs deposited by the 1st respondent shall be refunded to him immediately with interest accrued thereon.
iv) The 3rd respondent should be entitled to pursue her remedies against her husband in accordance with law.
v) The Learned Magistrate before whom the cases filed by the 3rd respondent are pending should bestow serious consideration of disposing of the same, as expeditiously as possible.
vi) The 3rd respondent shall bear the costs of the appellant which is quantified at Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) consolidated.
51. The appeals are allowed with the aforesaid directions.

I.A. for direction Dismissed.